The Problem of Church and State in Terms of the Nonestablishment and Free Exercise of Religion by Gilkey, Royal C.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 9 | Issue 1 Article 7
The Problem of Church and State in Terms of the
Nonestablishment and Free Exercise of Religion
Royal C. Gilkey
Copyright c 1967 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Royal C. Gilkey, The Problem of Church and State in Terms of the Nonestablishment and Free Exercise of
Religion, 9 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 149 (1967), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol9/iss1/7
THE PROBLEM OF CHURCH AND STATE IN TERMS OF
THE NONESTABLISHMENT AND FREE EXERCISE OF
RELIGION
ROYAL C. GnLXEY*
A BIBLICAL BASIS FOR SEPARATION
Separation of church and state is a significant factor in religious free-
dom. It is essentially negative in effect. It must be considered more than
-a limitation on government, and in fact, it amounts to a prohibition upon
it.
Two realms are recognized in the Bible: One realm belongs to God
:and the other to Caesar. This division between spiritual and secular
.spheres was expressed by Christ in ancient times when he declared:
"Render . . . unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto
-God the things that are God's." I
The problem is to determine whether something belongs to Caesar
or to God. Who has jurisdiction? There is a sharp difference among
people on this question, and Judges are no exception. American courts
have split in trying to resolve controversies involving the church-state
issue.
THE ORIGIN OF A MEANINGFUL METAPHOR-
"WALL OF SEPARATION"
A metaphor useful in deciding such cases has been "the wall of
separation." Thomas Jefferson coined the term in a letter to the Danbury
Baptists on the meaning of nonestablishment under the Constitution.2
*Cornell University B.A. (1941), MA. (1947); University of Minnesota Ph.D (1957).
Professor of Political Science (Public Law), West Virginia University.
1. Matthew 22:21. A slight difference in phraseology is noticeable in Mark 12:17,
which reads: "And Jesus answering said unto them [the Pharisees and Herodians]:
Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's."
2. Of the various sects in early America, the Baptists were the most outspoken
champions of church-state separation. Roger Williams founded Providence Plantations
in what is now Rhode Island on that principle. The record shows that
in the critical days of the Revolution no religious body exerted more
influence in overthrowing the established churches and securing their free-
dom than did the Baptist. John Leland, Chairman of the Virginia Baptist
General Committee, memorialized George Washington and received his
promise that the Constitution would provide for religious freedom. Bishop
Hawks in his Contributions to Ecclesiastical History gives full credit to the
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The key passage containing the words "wall of separation" was ori-
ginally quoted by Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite in deciding the
1878 case of Reynolds v. United States.3
BELIEF VERSUS ACTION AND THE REYNOLDS CASE
Reynolds tested the validity of a law against polygamy. This law had
been enacted by Congress when Utah was a Mormon-dominated terri-
tory. Reynolds, a Mormon, was indicted for having violated the statute.
His defense was that polygamous marriage was a matter of religious belief
with the Mormons. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, speaking through
Cheif Justice Waite, upheld the anti-polygamy statute. While Mormons
might believe in polygamy, they could not act out their religious belief
without subjecting themselves to the penalty of the law. What the
Court considered immoral in the light of civilized practices among
European and other states could hardly be ruled proper when proscribed
by law. The defendant would not be permitted to shield himself from
punishment for his crime behind the screen of religious doctrine. Con-
gress could reach action, even if belief lay beyond its reach. The Mor-
mon Reynolds, therefore, stood convicted of having committed the
moral and legal offense of polygamy.
Within the context of this case, Chief Justice Waite took occasion to
quote from Jefferson's message to the Danbury Baptist Association, to
whom the President said in explaining his conception of the scope of
First Amendment guarantees regarding religion:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between man and his God; that he owes account to none other for
Baptists for having achieved this victory. Isaac Backus, champion of the
rights of conscience, made his way from Massachusetts to Philadelphia to
present the cause to his colony's delegates at the first Continental Congress,
October, 1774.
Professor V. E. Garrison, Disciple historian, says that Virginia "only
under constant agitation by the Baptists (enacted) in 1786 the Statute for
Religious Freedom" which Thomas Jefferson drafted and of which he was
so proud he wished his authorship of it to be recorded on his tombstone.
Let it be remembered also that Baptists alone of all the denominations
of that day protested against a civil tax for the support of the churches.
Harkness, Baptist Contributions to the Anterican Way of Life, THE CHRONICLE,
July, 1949, p. 13 (reprinted). It can he said that "their radical attitude in the early
period toward the questions of the separation of church and state . had an impact
beyond their numbers that has persisted ever since. Ibid.
3. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers of the Govern-
ment reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with
sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which
declared that their Legislature should 'make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,'
thus building a wall of separation between Church and State.4
To Chief Justice Waite, these words represented the soundest con-
struction possible of the religion clauses on nonestablishment and free
exercise. "Coming as this does from an acknowledged leader of the
advocates of the measure," he wrote, "it may be accepted almost as
an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the [First]
amendment thus secured." 5
STATES SUBSEQUENTLY SUBJECT TO RELIGIOUS GUARANTEES
The Reynolds case, of course, dealt with the application of a federal
law to an offender. What about state laws? Were they subject to the
religious guarantees in the First Amendment? Originally, no. By Chief
Justice Marshall's 1833 decision in Barron v. Baltimore, the federal Bill
of Rights was held to limit national rather than state authority.6 Not
4. The source of this pronouncement is President Thomas Jefferson's "Reply to
Greetings from [a] Committee of the Danbury Baptist Ass'n of Connecticut," dated
"January 1, 1802." Chamberlin v. Dade County Board of Public Instruction, 143 So.2d
21, at 25, n.8. (19 ).
With reference to this,
Jefferson wrote his "wall of separation" letter in response to an address
expressing "the affectionate sentiments, of esteem and approbation" ac-
corded him by the Danbury, Conn., Baptist Association-a group hard
pressed in a state where another denomination was the established religion.
Jules Loh, "T. Jefferson Began Church Issue in 1802: Coined Phrase in Letter to
[Baptist] Group," The Morgantown Post, September 22, 1960, p. 14, col. 1.
The quoted passage may be found in Chief Justice Waite's opinion for the Court
in Reynolds v. United States, supra note 3, at 164.
5. Ibid.
6. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (18 ). Toward the end of this final constitutional ruling
in which Chief Justice Marshall took part, he declared on behalf of his brethren on
the U.S. Supreme Court:
In almost every convention by which the Constitution was adopted, amend-
ments to guard against the abuse of power were recommended. These
amendments demanded security against the' apprehended encroachments'
of the general government, not against those of the local governments.
In compliance with a sentiment thus generally expressed, to quiet fears K
thus extensively entertained, amendments were proposed by the required
majority in Congress, and adopted by the states. These amendments contain
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until the 1930's, however, did the U.S. Supreme Court get around to
"absorbing" the substantive freedom guarantees in the First Amendi-
ment into the due process clause of the Fourteenth.7 The "incorpora-
tion" theory sufficed to bring the religion clauses into play against state
encroachment.8
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS VERSUS MILITARY TRAINING REQUIREMENT
AT STATE UNIVERSITY-HAMILTON V. REGENTS
The first case in which the religion clause was applied to the states
turned out to be Hamilton v. Regents of University of California, de-
cided in 1934.1 There the Court, speaking through Justice Butler, held
that California could require military training as a condition of admission
to the state university, religious objection to the contrary notwithstand-
ing. In this instance, students having such religious scruples were not
denied due process of law because they were in no way compelled to
attend the university. In the course of his opinion for the Court, Butler
acknowledged that the "liberty" guaranteed in the due process clause
included the right of the objectors to hold the beliefs on which they
based their refusal to submit to required military training at the univer-
sity. Still, the obligation to undergo such training while receiving
academic instruction remained.
no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the state govern-
ments. This Court cannot so apply them.
id. at 250.
For a concise and informative comment on Barron v. Baltimore, supra, in terms of
its setting and the subsequent reversal of a good part of its original effect, see R. E. Cush-
man in collaboration with R. F. CUSHMAN, LEADING CONSTITLUIONAL DECISIONs 74-75
(13th ed. 1966).
7. In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), the Court, speaking through
Justice Sanford, declared in the course of a majority opinion that affirmed Gitlow's
conviction under the state's Criminal Anarchy Act: "For present purposes we may
and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press-which are protected by the
First Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental personal
rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from impairment by the states."
Not until six years later did the Supreme Court declare a state "padlock injunction"
law bad as violative of free speech and press in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
This was the first such invalidation of a state statute under the "incorporation" theory.
See ROBERT EuGENE CUSHMAN, LEADING CONSTITUTIONAL DFcisioNs 157 (12th ed. 1963).
8. The absorption of Bill of Rights guarantees into the Fourteenth Amendment is a
fascinating story in itself. For a scholarly discussion of how far it has carried, see
Robert Fairchild Cushman, Incorporation: Die Process and Bill of Rights," 51 CORNtI.
L. Q. 467 (1966).
9. 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
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A concurring opinion was filed by Justice Cardozo, who assumed that
the First Amendment's guarantee of religious freedom against federal
infringement likewise protected against state invasion. At the same time,
he could not see how the California law would operate to inhibit the
free exercise of religion. The objecting students could have gone else-
where for their higher education. If they chose to attend an institution
financed by state funds, they would have to comply with all require-
ments for study there. They were not directly compelled to attend
the state university, but if they elected to do so, the compulsion upon
them to take military drill would become effective. Cardozo's practical
point of view persuaded both Brandeis and Stone to join his con-
currence.
JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES AND "PREFERRED POSITION"
Hamilton v. Regents recognized that the First Amendment's free exer-
cise clause operated through the Fourteenth to prevent state interference
with religious belief, even if the circumstances were such that those who
invoked it did so in vain. The Jehovah's Witness cases that followed
kept the religious issue alive and resulted in a series of decisions that
were mostly favorable to the members of that sect. In fact, a "preferred
position" for religious liberty appeared well on the way to being
realized.' 0
Actual use of the term "preferred position" occurred first in a 1942 Je-
hovah's Witness case, wherein Stone, who had meanwhile become Chief
Justice, dissented from a majority opinion upholding municipal license
taxes on booksalesmen as applied in the City of Opelika, Alabama, to
Witnesses engaging in the distribution of religious literature." Stone
10. "Preferred position" got its start in an unobtrusive footnote to Justice Stone's
opinion for the Court in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938),
which upheld the Filled Milk Act that Congress had passed in 1923 under its power
to regulate interstate commerce. Since the law in question could have been enacted
by reasonable men, there was no warrant to invalidate it as a violation of Fifth
Amendment due process. The law would have to be presumed valid. Right at this
point, Stone added footnote 4 saying: "There may be narrower scope for operation
of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within
a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth."
Not long afterward, this rather tentatively advanced and carefully qualified footnote
took on the dimensions of a constitutional doctrine according a "preferred position" to
civil liberty guarantees.
11. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942) [hereinafter designated Opelika I]. Note
that Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) [hereinafter designated Opelika II], set aside
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stressed that the freedom guarantees extended to nondiscriminatory as
well as discriminatory attempts to restrict liberty. Therefore, appli-
cation of a general tax ordinance to colporteurs should be barred be-
cause the Constitution placed freedom of speech and religion in a
"preferred position." 12
Chief Justice Stone's argument (though sharply criticized by adver-
saries like Justice Frankfurter who believed that religious immunity
from nondiscriminatory taxation amounted to a subsidy to religion in
violation of the constitutional ban on establishment) won support from
other members of the Court, notably Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy,
and Rutledge. These libertarian activists came to insist on higher
standards in determining questions of constitutionality than the reason-
able man test when civil liberties were at stake. Indeed, the "preferred
position" doctrine if given extreme application would shift the burden
of proof to the state which would have to overcome a presumption of
invalidity in applying a statute whose effect might restrict the com-
munication of ideas. A less extreme view of "preferred position" would
only insist that case for such restriction should rest upon overwhelming-
ly persuasive grounds." Interpreting the Constitution by either premise
would, of course, benefit Jehovah's Witnesses in their aggressive street
and door-to-door campaigns to proselytize people.
the decision in Opelika I by a per curiarn judgment and opinion based on a majority
opinion by Justice Douglas deciding Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), on
the same day, May 3rd. The reversal of Opelika I by Opelika II turned on a 5 to 4
vote holding the municipal booksellers' license tax ordinance in question unconstitutional.
This reversal took place through the accident of a change of personnel on the Court.
The majority of five in Opelika I became a minority with the resignation of Justice
Byrnes. He was replaced by Justice Rutledge who sided with what had been the
Opelika I minority (of Stone, Black, Douglas, and Murphy), thereby transforming it
into the majority that controlled decision in Opelika II.
•12. Here are Stone's exact words:
The First Amendment is not confined to safeguard freedom of speech and
freedom of religion against discriminatory attempts to wipe them out. On
the contrary, the Constitution, by virtue of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, has put those freedoms in a preferred position (emphasis added).
Their commands are not restricted to cases where the protected privilege is
sought out for attack. They extend at least to every form of taxation
which, because it is a condition of the exercise of the privilege, is capable
of being used to control or suppress it.
Dissenting opinion in Jones v. Opelika I, supra note 11, at 608.
13. See P~aRcHE-rr, THE AmERiaac CONSTITuTION 393 (1959), for a precise statement
as to the divergent views taken by extreme and moderate preferred positionists. Judicial
restraintists like Felix Frankfurter would have nothing to do with either conception
of "preferred position."
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It should occasion no surprise to learn that claims to religious liberty
were accorded wide latitude during the late 1930's and early '40's. In
those years, the Supreme Court upheld, often over vigorous dissents, the
right to solicit money for religious purposes without having to secure
prior permission from the police; the right to disseminate religious
pamphlets in public places; and the right to peddle religious works
without paying the fee for a license that was required of all other
peddlers.14 Such decisions have served to build up a body of constitu-
tional law regarding religious liberty. This development must be
credited to the missionary zeal of the Jehovah's Witnesses in spreading
their gospel via the spoken and printed word accompanied by home
visitation.'6
In order to decide controversies provoked by such activities, the
judiciary has had to explore the scope and meaning of the religion
clauses. This has not been easy, causing cleavages among the judges in
a bewildering array of cases. Yet, the problem of the co-existence of
diverse religions in a free and open society has been aired in a salutary
way. Constitutionally speaking, the country has profited from its ex-
perience with the Witnesses.' They have caused other Americans to
14. See ROBERT EUGENE CUSHMAN, OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS: CIviL LIER-
TIs-AN AMERICAN HERTAGE 8 (Ist ed. 1944).
To illustrate the rulings (favorable to Jehovah's Witnesses) therein referred to, the
U.S. Supreme Court in Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), unanimously knocked
out a municipal ordinance in Griffin, Georgia, that required the city manager's per-
mission to distribute leaflets.
Similarly, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Court unanimously in-
validated a state law that forbade soliciting funds for any charitable or religious pur-
pose without previous approval by the secretary of the state's public welfare council.
Four years later, the High Tribunal ruled that it was unconstitutional for the South
Carolina City of McCormick to apply a book vending license ordinance to peddlers of
religious books, whose activity could be regarded as involving religion in such a way as
to enjoy immunity from taxation. Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
15. As to home visitation, account should be taken of Martin v. City of Struthers,
Ohio, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). There a municipal ordinance prohibited ringing doorbells,
rapping on doors, or otherwise summoning occupants of dwelling places in order to
pass out tracts, advertisements, handbills, or circulars. Thelma Martin, a Jehovah's Wit-
ness, challenged this Struthers ordinance as an infringement of her constitutional rights
to religious liberty and freedom of the press. The majority in an opinion by Justice
Black held the ordinance unconstitutional, while conceding that reasonable police
regulations as to the times and manner of such distribution might be permissible where
the health and well-being of society were at stake. In any event, the individual house-
holder would have to be left free to decide whether to receive or exclude unsolicited
callers.
16. See Waite, The Debt of Constitutional Law to Jehovah's Witnesses, 28 MiNN.
L. REv. 209 (1944).
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reexamine presuppositions about democracy. In consequence, vox populi,
vox dei has been found wanting as a national credo.
THE COMPULSORY FLAG SALUTE CONTROVERSY
Majority rule can hardly monopolize the situation because of a neces-
sary respect for minority rights, if free institutions are to survive. The
lesson of the compulsory flag salute controversy was hard to learn but is
unlikely to be forgotten. Indeed, it caused the Court to flip-flop on the
issue before reaching a sound solution-one that would accord con-
scientious scruples requisite constitutional protection.
On the threshold of the Second World War, an attempt to inculcate
patriotism was made by requiring daily flag salute ceremonies in the
public schools. Jehovah's Witnesses refused to participate in the belief
that to do so would violate God's commandments, namely:
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
Thou shalt not make unto thee graven image, or any likeness of
any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath,
or that is in the water under the earth:
Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them....
Trying to follow these words literally, Lillian and William Gobitis,
12 and 10 years of age respectively, found themselves expelled from
public school in Minersville, Pennsylvania, for their refusal, as Jehovah's
Witnesses, to salute, and pledge allegiance to, the American flag during
their school's daily exercises. Both children regarded the Stars and
Stripes as a forbidden image within the meaning of Jehovah's command
not to "bow down" before it. It would be better to suffer expulsion
from class than to incur God's wrath for disobedience to a divine com-
mandment, they may well have thought-unless their father and mother
did their thinking for them on this matter.' s
17. Exodus 20:3-5 (King James Version). Compare the language of the same Scrip-
tural source in THE OxFoRD ANNOTATED BIBLE WITH THE APOCRYPHA, REVISED STANDARD
VERs ON (May & Metzger ed. 1965):
3. "You shall have no other gods before me.
4. "You shall not make for yourself a graven image, or any likeness of
anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is
in the water under the earth;
5. you shall not bow down to them or serve them ...
Exodus 20:3-5.
18. On the point of God's wrath, the Scriptures tell in Exodus 20:5-6 how Jehovah
[Vol. 9:149
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Because of Pennsylvania's compulsory education law, the Gobitis
children had to be placed in priyate school. The expenses this entailed
led their father to bring suit to obtain an injunction against conditioning
his children's attendance at Minersville public school on participation
in the 'daily flag salute ceremony. The first judgment was favorable
but unfortunately for Mr. Gobitis not final.
While Judge Maris of the federal District Court afforded relief, the
U.S. Supreme Court by an 8-1 decision 9 cancelled it by reversing the
judgment below. In delivering the Court's opinion, Justice Frankfurter
declared that religious liberty was not absolute. Some compromises
might become necessary, he said, to cultivate a national feeling of unity
upon which to base the nation's security. He regarded the courtroom
as an improper forum to determine educational policy. Judges were
hardly competent to pronounce upon educational psychology and
pedagogical policy, not being experts in either field. In any event,
Minersville's board of education was better equipped than the U.S.
Supreme Court to deal with the question of requiring a flag salute in
the classroom.
The Supreme Court's opinion shocked libertarians and evoked wide-
spread criticism.2- Several members of the Court even began to have
second thoughts about the ruling. These misgivings found expression
in 1942 when in an unprecedented public recantation, Justices Black,
reminded the people of severe sanctions behind his commandments and the reward for
keeping them in these words:
5. . .. I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the
fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that
hate me;
6. And shewing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep
my commandments.
19. Justice Frankfurter rendered the Court's opinion. Justice McReynolds concurred
in the result without opinion. Justice Stone submitted a vigorous dissenting opinion.
Minersville School District v. Gobitis 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
20. To illustrate the nature of the criticism, Professor Robert Eugene Cushman
wrote in April of the year following the controversial Gobitis decision:
All of the eloquence by which the majority extol the ceremony of flag
saluting as a free expression of patriotism turns sour when used to describe
the brutal compulsion which requires a sensitive and conscientious child to
stultify himself in public. The decision in the case is disheartening for three
reasons: first, because it is a departure from a long line of decisions pro-
tecting fundamental civil liberties; second, because it is an eight-to-one
decision; third, because the opinion of the Court was written by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, long associated in the public mind with the vigorous defense
of civil liberty.
Cushman, Constitutional Law in 1939-1940, 35 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 250, 271 (1941).
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Murphy, and Douglas revealed that they had become convinced of
the Court's error in deciding the Gobitis case the way it did.2'
The leading ideas set forth in Justice Stone's classic dissent in Gobitis
very likely had more than a little to do with swinging people away from
Felix Frankfurter's position on the question of the compulsory flag
salute toward another disposition of that explosive issue. Stone pointed
out that the compulsory flag salute suppressed free speech and religious
liberty in the process of coercing school children into expressing what
they could not believe. That alone was stultifying to one's conscience.
To use the power of government to force people to affirm what ran
counter to their religious training could hardly be justified by talk
about instilling a sense of unity. Indeed, the opposite would result from
the bitterness engendered. Surely, the ingenuity encouraged by free gov-
ernment would be able to make use of other devices to foster unity
than what to some could be little more than a meaningless gesture. It
was difficult for Justice Stone to perceive how government here would
suffer injury from letting unorthodox religionists adhere to their par-
ticular beliefs. There was nothing to be gained from riding roughshod
over a politically helpless minority's religious sensibilities. The Court,
Stone insisted, had the duty to intervene when legislative judgments
placed in jeopardy liberties guaranteed in the federal Bill of Rights.
Otherwise, it would abdicate its responsibility as a guardian of the Con-
stitution, to whose upholding all judges were bound by oath or affirma-
tion. The state's interest in maintaining classroom discipline was scarce-
21. This the three justices did as part of the dissent submitted in Opelika I, wherein
they jointly declared:
The opinion of the Court sanctions a [tax] device which in our opinion
suppresses or tends to suppress the free exercise of a religion practiced by
a minority group [of Jehovah's Witnesses]. This is but another step in the
direction which Minersville School District v. Gobitis . . . took against the
same religious minority and is a logical extension of the principles upon
which that decision rested. Since we joined in the opinion of the Gobitis
case, we think this is an appropriate occasion to state that we now believe
that it was also wrongly decided. Certainly our democratic form of govern-
ment functioning under the historic Bill of Rights has a high responsibility to
accommodate itself to the religious views of minorities however unpopular
and unorthodox those views may be. The First Amendment does not put
the right freely to exercise religion in a subordinate position. We fear,
however, that the opinions in . . . [the instant controversy] and in the
Gobitis case do exactly that.
Memorandum of retraction submitted on June 8, 1942 by Justices Black, Douglas, and
Murphy as a supplement to their Opelika I dissent, Jones v. Opelika, supra note 11
at 623-24.
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ly of such dimension as to outweigh the people's stake in the preservation
of their liberties, including religious freedom.
Justice Stone's way of looking at the problem had the future on its
side. Libertarians lauded him for challenging all alone the majority's
position. They were convinced that his ringing appeal for protection to
the still, small voice of conscience lay in the best tradition of the litera-
ture championing individual freedom and predicted that his dissenting
opinion in the Gobitis case would outlast what it was protesting against,
and become a classic among liberty-loving peoplesY2
The votes of the recanting three judges added to that of the lone
dissenter in the Gobitis case had swollen the minority position on the
flag-salute issue to four out of nine. One more vote on Stone's side of
the question would produce a majority in favor of reversing the 1940
precedent set in the Minersville School District case. That vote was
forthcoming from Justice Rutledge who had replaced Justice Byrnes
during February 1943. 3
If the reversal of the first U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding
the compulsory flag salute might have been anticipated, it took until
June 14, 1943 for this to occur. The judicial line-up against it at that
time turned out to be more than a bare majority. Six judges voted to
invalidate West Virginia's requirement for pupils and teachers alike
to salute the flag in public schools. 24 Justice Jackson spoke for a Court
that was now dominated by a differently-minded majority from the
one that had determined the Pennsylvania precedent against the Gobitis
children only three short years before.25
22. Compare Professor Robert E. Cushman's statement: "Mr. Justice Stone's opinion
deserves a place in the classic literature of civil liberty. It seems ... to dispose ef-
fectively of the reasoning of the majority opinion." Cushman, supra note 20, at 271.
23. Wiley B. Rutledge, whose father was an itinerant Baptist preacher, had been
named by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in 1939. He served as such for four years, during which his judicial
voting record showed him disposed to hold invalid legislation that had a restrictive
effect on Jehovah's Witnesses. It was, therefore, apparent that his elevation by
President F.D.R. to the federal Supreme Court in early 1943 would produce additional
judicial support for the constitutional claims of that sect.
24. The judges so voting included Black, Murphy, Douglas, Jackson, Rutledge, JJ.,
and Stone, Ch. J.
25. Robert H. Jackson had been appointed an associate justice in June 1941, one year
after the Minersville School District case had been decided on June 3, 1940. His con-
stitutional viewpoint with reference, to the claims of Jehovah's Witnesses was less
predictable than that of his colleague on the Court, Rutledge. It should be noted
that Jackson had voted with the opposite side from Stone's libertarian group in the
Opelika controversies on the question of applying a nondiscriminatory municipal ped-
1967]
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While Jackson spoke for the Court in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette,26 others spoke for themselves, with Frankfurter
doing all the talking in dissent. -7 The facts of the controversy that pro-
dlers tax to Jehovah's Witnesses seeking to sell sectarian books and pamphlets as part
of a "conversion" campaign.
Hard to be pegged, Justice Jackson constantly wrestled with the difficult problem of
accommodating the conflict between claims to individual liberty and the demands of
order under the rule of law. Compare the following quotation from "Resolutions"
addressed to the U.S. Supreme Court on April 4, 1955 under the caption "In Memory
of Honorable Robert Houghwout Jackson," deceased:
"His opinions show a deep concern over the difficult problem of accom-
modating the sometimes conflicting purposes of maintaining freedom of
the individual and, at the same time, a stable order of society under the
reign of a rule of law. But he was generally on the side of full application
of the Bill of Rights until he was convinced that the rule of law was
seriously threatened."
75 S.Ct. 11, 21. (Page numbers italicized in original because preliminary to pagination
for reported cases.)
26. 319 US. 624 (1943).
27. More specifically, Justice Jackson delivered the Court's opinion. A joint con-
curring opinion was submitted by Justices Black and Douglas. Justice Murphy filed a
concurring opinion. Justices Roberts and Reed stated their adherence to the opinion
rendered by Justice Frankfurter for the Court in the 1940 Gobitis case. Justice Frank-
furter produced a lengthy dissenting opinion.
It should be noted that Justice Jackson's opinion for the Court represented the views
of Chief Justice Stone and Justice Rutledge. As for the others voting to overrule the
Gobitis decision, John Raeburn Green has pointed out that
J.. justices Black and Douglas declined to follow Mr. Justice Jackson, who
gave the opinion of the Court in placing the decision upon invasion of the
"freedom of silence," their concurrence in the result being soley upon
the free exercise of religion ....
Note, The Supreme Court, the Bill of Rights and the States, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 623,
n.68 (1949).
Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion went further than the one that represented the
Court's view in Gobitis. Presumably, that is why it failed to attract the concurrence
of any of his colleagues. Justices Roberts and Reed, also in dissent, preferred simply
to state that they adhered to the Court's opinion (earlier rendered by Justice Frank-
furter) in the Gobitis case.
John Raeburn Green's analysis offers this explanation of why Justice Frankfurter
found himself virtually alone in the Barnette case:
[Wihereas his opinion in the Gobitis case had commanded concurrence
of six members of the Court, his much more profound opinion in the
Barnette case now failed to receive the concurrence of any; two of the
former six, Justices Roberts and Reed, preferring-to state simply that they
adhered to the earlier opinion. Here may perhaps' lie one clue to the in-
firmity of the unanimous [or near-unanimous] opinion. Presumably it must
pay for the support it commands by the acceptance of compromising modi-
fications. And the opinion suggests another consideration. While Mr. Justice
Frankfurter expressed the view of the Court more adequately in the
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duced such a split among the justices in reversing themselves between
1940 and 1943 were simple, even if provocative of fine-line distinctions
in attitude. West Virginia's legislature authorized the teaching of courses
designed to foster and perpetuate Americanism. The State Board of
Education then adopted a resolution containing recitals from Frank-
furter's majority opinion in the Gobitis case. This resolution required
flag-salute ceremonies in the schools, accompanied by a pledge of al-
legiance to be taken by all pupils and teachers. Refusals to participate
would be tantamount to insubordination punishable by expulsion. By
statutory provision, those expelled could gain readmittance only upon
compliance. Pending compliance, whoever was expelled would be con-
sidered illegally absent from school and hence chargeable with delin-
quency. That could lead to a fine and jail term for the parent or
guardian responsible.
An action was brought by Jehovah's Witnesses in federal district
court to enjoin the enforcement of these rules against members of their
sect. West Virginia's State Board of Education moved to dismiss the
complaint, which was based on allegations that the compulsory flag-salute
law and regulations under it violated constitutional guarantees of re-
ligious liberty and free speech. The plaintiffs were successful before the
three-judge district court in obtaining a judgment that enjoined en-
forcement of the flag-salute requirement against Jehovah's Witnesses.
The case then went on direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
affirmed the judgment below.
The majority on the High Bench thought that to require people to
salute the flag and recite the pledge of allegiance amounted to com-
pelling them to affirm a belief. That constituted a forbidden invasion
of spirit and mind which the First and Fourteenth Amendments were
meaft to preserve from governmental control. The Constitution placed
this sphere beyond the control of officials. Besides, coerced conformity
was no way to foster national unity. That could be accomplished most
effectively by example and persuasion. Resort to force would only be
self-defeating.
Under the Constitution, people had the right to differ about things
Gobitis case, nevertheless when he wrote as a dissenter, with his back to
..the wall, his opinion rose to new heights. In the field of law, at least, it
appears that formidable opposition has a strengthening effect upon the
opinion.
Id. at 623. Apparently, nobody else on the Bench was willing to go all the way with
Justice Frankfurter in dissent on the compulsory flag-salute question. Thus, his final
pronouncements as a dissenter on the issue amounted to a solo performance.
1967)
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
going to the heart of the social order. Orthodoxy might not be com-
pelled in politics, economics, nationalism, or religion. Matters of faith
and belief lay beyond the reach of public authority. In Justice Jackson's
words: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or enforce
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." 28 The spokesman
for the Court could think of no exception to that principle. He feared
that any attempt to unify opinion would begin with coercing dissenters
and end with their extermination. Accordingly, he warned: "Those
who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves extermi-
nating dissenters." " The horror of Hitler's gas chambers to that end
was all too real during the war against the Nazis. Had it not been
gruesomely demonstrated beyond all doubt, inquired the man who was
later to prosecute the Nazi war criminals at Niirnberg (Nuremburg) in
Germany, that "compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the
unanimity of the graveyard"?30 America under the Constitution had
no place for any equivalent to the German dictator's ein Volk, ein
Reich, en Fiihrer. The application of any such formula here must surely
destroy the open multi-group society flourishing in the United States.
To say It Can't Happen Here in the words of the title of a novel by
Sinclair Lewis would be tempting fate to prove once again that eternal
vigilance is the price of liberty. Experience teaches a dear school, but
fools will learn in no other.
Reflections like these may well have led the U.S. Supreme Court to
lower the boom decisely on the compulsory flag salute. It acted on
the strength of its commission rather than by the authority of its com-
petence in such matters, said the Court's spokesman. Upon the judiciary
lay the awesome responsibility of giving meaning to the words of the
Constitution. It would not shirk its duty to keep what the Bill of Rights
was meant to safeguard beyond the vicissitudes of political controversy.
Religious opinion was not a matter for the majority to decide. The
beliefs of a minority enjoyed an immunity from popular control. The
state would have to stay out of an area that belonged to God rather
than Caesar. Any restriction would lack legitimacy unless clearly war-
ranted by immediate and grave danger to interests lawfully entrusted
to the state's care.
28. 319 U.S. at 642.
29. Id. at 641.
30. Ibid.
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Local school boards could hardly regard themselves as outside the
purview of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its limitations applied to all
agencies of state authority. Like the state, they remained accountable
for observing the freedom guarantees in the federal Constitution. There
was no excuse for not doing so in the instant case. Accordingly, the
compulsory flag salute would have to go. No level of government could
sanction it any longer. The Constitution forbade it.
Justice Frankfurter disagreed. Elaborating upon his opinion for the
Court in the Gobitis case, he explained that the place to remedy foolish
legislation was in the legislature rather than the courtroom. Education
in the abandonment of unwise legislation would best come through the
electoral processes. States should be left free to experiment. If a law
should prove unsound, the responsibility of getting rid of it should lie
with the lawmakers responding to pressures generated among the
voters.
The judiciary properly had other functions to perform in a democracy
than those of a school board or superlegislature for the whole nation.
Its job was not to make policy, but to interpret and apply the law in
particular circumstances. Being an appointive oligarchy, it could hardly
take the place of a legislative body.
If legislators could in reason resolve upon a course of action, it was
not for the Court to say them nay. The old common law touchstone
of reasonableness furnished the most reliable standard. Under the cir-
cumstances, the legislative judgment as to the need for inculcating
patriotism by way of flag-salute ceremonies in the public schools met
the test of rationality at a time when war clouds were rolling up over
the horizon. Public schools represented a vital symbol of national unity
for a nation drawn from many sources. To require pupils to pledge
alliance and salute the flag as part of their public school education
would enhance the spirit of unity necessary for national survival in a
warring world. A legislative determination to that end passed the reason-
able-man test.
To Frankfurter, no other basis for challenge to the validity of the
compulsory flag salute existed. The suggestion of a preferred position
for freedom of conscience aroused only a negative response in him. He
could find nothing in the Constitution to warrant according some rights
a preferred position over others. Was it not a happenstance that the
substantive freedoms guaranteed by the federal Bill of Rights had ended
up in the First Amendment rather than in another? More than ten
amendments were among those originally proposed for a federal bill of
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rights. That not all were adopted is a matter of historical fact. By
fortuitous circumstance, then, the liberty guarantees were provided for
first. This was no basis to accord preference to a claim of conscience
over some other right, like that of property.
If the doctrine of a preferred position for the freedom guarantees
lacked soundness, so did the idea of testing alleged infringements by
"clear and present danger." Justice Holmes had originated and subse-
quently employed those words as a felicitous phrase or literary allusion
without intending them to become a criterion of constitutionality. Al-
lowing "clear and present danger" to become such a criterion would
have the unfortunate consequence of leading to a mechanical juris-
prudence. Justice Frankfurter wanted none of that. He therefore could
not accept what Justice Jackson as the Court's spokesman had to say
on the score of a different standard (from the test of rationality) to
adjudge limitations on freedom of expression.
In elaborating his views on the compulsory flag salute, Justice Frank-
furter made it clear that his personal feelings lay with the Jehovah's
Witnesses claiming exemption from the requirement. As one who be-
longed to the most vilified minority in history, he would be the last
to favor a policy of conformity at the expense of dissenters. It was
because he believed that judicial intervention on behalf of the Witnesses
in the flag-salute cases would exceed the Court's proper role in a
democracy that his position took an illibertarian turn.
A champion of judicial restraint on the Bench, he felt himself obliged
to defend his stand on the ground that liberty would find its maximum
security in community sensitivity to its claims rather than in a court-
room. The community must learn to shoulder responsibility rather
than "pass the buck" to courts. It should be allowed to do so by trial
and error in keeping with the pragmatic processes of working out
solutions to social problems. Community enlightenment, so important to
the successful operation of democracy, would only come that way. For
the Court to play "Big Brother" would have the effect of preventing
self-government from realizing its full potential.
From beginning to end of the compulsory flag-salute controversy,
Justice Frankfurter remained convinced that the claims of liberty would
have their best and ultimate vindication outside the courtroom because
the final repository of the most precious values of civilization lay in
the community itself. There and there alone would the battle be won
against unabated efforts to shackle the free spirit of mankind. In this
conception of things lay a noble idealism regarding the way to deal
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with the dilemma of majority rule and minority rights3 1 Yet, in the
face of the persuasive power of Felix Frankfurter's eloquence, a gnaw-
ing doubt about the practicality of his fine-spun theory generated a
feeling among many of his compatriots that the Supreme Court's final
resolution of the compulsory flag-salute controversy would stand as the
right one because most truly expressive of the American heritage of
religious freedom as against the countervailing claims of public author-
ity.
31. See COMMAGER, MAJonrry R-LE AND MINoRITY RIGHTS (1943).
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